Variations of the secretary problem via Game Theory and Linear Programming
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Abstract
This paper presents models for three variants of the secretary problem based on a strategic form of zero-sum finite games for two players. Based on the minimax theorem for finite games, the problem of maximizing the minimum average payoff of a player, in spite of the strategies of the other player, is represented by a linear programming model, which solution using the simplex method presents not only one optimum strategy to the player, but validates some strategies also as optimal.
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How to Cite
de Carvalho, M., Chaves, L. M., & Silva, R. M. de A. (2008). Variations of the secretary problem via Game Theory and Linear Programming. INFOCOMP Journal of Computer Science, 7(3), 78–82. Retrieved from https://infocomp.dcc.ufla.br/index.php/infocomp/article/view/232
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